Political capital is a term in political science that explains the actions of politicians (usually popular ones) in an economic cost-benefit sense. It is an abstract quantity; having more of it means a politician can take more risks and put his reputation on the line to get what he wants. Having less of it could mean that the leader is increasingly unpopular, has become a ‘lame duck’, or will have to resort to more authoritarian means to get the job done.
Quick examples: President Noynoy Aquino has tremendous positive political capital. President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s is in the negative. President Barack Obama’s political capital was sky high when he got elected, but is near zero right now due to the ill economic climate in the United States and his seeming inability to change it.
Defining the term
As a quantity, political capital can rise or fall. Moreover, all political actors (defined as agents who can affect the political system) have varying levels of political capital. Some have more than others.
Moreover, political capital is required to get the job done. Remember that ‘capital’ is a term borrowed from economics. To grossly oversimplify it, capital is money (in investment terms your starting money), so political capital is ‘political money’ which you use to ‘buy’ (get done) certain things.
So how does political capital rise or fall?
A lot of it has to do popularity. Popular leaders have very high political capital. Logically therefore, leaders will do everything to remain popular in order to retain high levels of political capital. So the question to ask is: How does a politician become popular? I’m sure you can write some down. Go on, I’ll wait.
And as money, this capital can be spent. It can be lost. The most logical way is to adopt a stance that is unpopular. But note that unpopular here doesn’t necessarily mean wrong. It can be as simple as being ‘not the most popular’.
Here is an example: When Obama took office, the highest concern was the economy. Reforming health care was also a concern, but it wasn’t the highest. Obama devoted his entire first year to health care, expending a lot of political capital to drum up support for it, however ending up with very modest results. In the process he lost a lot of political capital in convincing people to support health care over the economy, and lost even more because of its ultimate result.
Therefore, performance matters a lot in the rise and fall of political capital too. Success is a boost while failure is a drag. Need I explain this?
But we just have to note however, that politicians these days are so good at spinning their stories that a success can be seen as a failure, and failure a success. Just this evening I read a report where the Aquino administration explained why they failed to pay attention to climate change warnings — they were too busy solving the graft and corruption left by Arroyo. That’s incredible spin right there. They know they’re going to lose political capital anyway so they did their best to minimize their loss by bashing on Arroyo — a leader so unpopular (her political capital in the negative) that bashing her (a political act that costs capital) will end in a positive. Do you think it worked though?
Lastly, political capital factors in a lot in the formation and maintenance of political allies. Though Filipinos allegedly enjoy a good underdog story, at the end of the day we back the llamado. We back the winner. Understandably, politicians want to be affiliated with one who has high political capital in the hopes that it will have a positive halo effect on themselves. Of course, political opponents will exist. There will always be people who will oppose your viewpoint on various grounds. And those who oppose you would want to ally themselves with an alternative source of political capital in order to get what they want done.
Political fights will cost political capital on both sides. Logic dictates that the winner can walk away with higher capital at the end of a fight. That’s a safe assumption to make. Political actors who feel that they are guaranteed victory will obviously want to fight. But from time to time, the fight itself could be unpopular (think of the last issue where you said, “Not that again!”), creating a net negative effect on both sides. Hence, the expression of picking your battles.
So how does this work in the real world?
Let’s use some examples.
First, the RH Bill fight.
An analysis of how political capital shifted between the government and the Church can explain why it failed. While the bill itself was popular (7 in 10 supported it), the fight over it wasn’t. President Aquino could have used his own political capital to push the measure through Congress, but the fight between PRO and ANTI forces got so bad that the last thing Aquino wanted was to be seen as the President who legalized abortion. Even if that weren’t true, it was too messy a fight. Aquino would have gotten the RH Bill done but at a large political cost. He didn’t want to spend it all at such an early part of his term.
Second, the impeachment of CJ Corona.
This is the first big move of the Aquino Presidency where I can see him cashing in on his political capital. Notice how openly he attacked CJ Corona and the Supreme Court. Notice how quickly 188 votes were gathered to transmit the articles of impeachment to the Senate. With a 7 in 10 approval rating versus Corona’s 4 in 10, Aquino felt that he had a sure win. That’s why he picked the fight. All he had to do was play the GMA card and the deal is done.
Or is it?
Here is where I inject some of my own political analyses, still using the concept of political capital. You may see differently.
In my opinion, President Aquino and his team have gravely underestimated the cost of this fight.
Their first miscalculation was hoping that CJ Corona would resign. That he just submitted a 79-page response to the Senate summons is an affirmative sign that this impeachment trial will be pushing through. I don’t see the Senate dismissing this case outright either. Doing so will cost them tremendous political capital in the eyes of the people. And some Senators running for re-election in 2013 would need the time to be seen on TV and grow in popularity.
The worst case scenario for the Aquino government is for this trial to run long. Every second that this trial runs, Aquino will be spending — maybe even bleeding – political capital. In addition, there are signs that our people’s attention may be moving on to other matters. The devastation brought down by Sendong — a Black Swan event — is poised to make us rethink the true abilities of the Aquino government.
Furthermore, let us not discount the global mood. Europe is in a deepening recession. America is struggling. Soon enough, Obama will be gunning for re-election. There is no doubt that jobs and the middle class will be the political buzzwords of the 2012 US campaign. That will be the political zeitgeist of 2012.
In the wake of the Arab spring and the Occupy movement, governments will be pressed more than ever to make government fair and accountable to its people. This mood will inevitably seep into our country. The question the Aquino administration will need to ask however is this: Is the impeachment of CJ Corona enough to convince the Filipino people that their government is serious about making the system fair for everyone? Or will our people look for something more?
Concluding remarks
The untold story about political capital is that we, the ordinary citizens, have political capital too. It is what allows our fragile democracy to keep chugging along as we get to elect our leaders every six years and maintain one of the world’s most vibrant civil societies.
I understand that reducing all political actions in terms of political capital can come across as cynical. After all, human beings are capable of sacrifice too. Not everything has to be about lose or gain. I agree. Tell our politicians that.
On a personal note, though I was originally opposed with the House impeachment of Corona (and still am), I am now convinced that there is no other recourse than to go through the Senate impeachment process. I just hope it doesn’t get dragged on too long, but I wouldn’t mind a protracted trial if rules, laws, and procedures dominate, not politics. Some may say that Corona doesn’t deserve that propriety — that he, as a midnight appointee, must be taken out forcibly. Rule of Law is not deserved by someone who did not uphold Rule of Law. He should just resign to spare us the trouble. I still disagree. For if we ourselves don’t uphold the Rule of Law, then we don’t deserve it. Change must begin with us. I’d like to think that we ourselves have the political will to do the right thing, or maybe not.
